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FORUM
Supreme Court Decisions
In Criminal Jury Trials:
Six Jurors is the Minimum
On March 21, 1978, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously
that in criminal cases a trial with less than six jurors is uncon-
stitutional. In Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978), the Court
agreed that the defendant's obscenity conviction by a five
person jury deprived him of his right to trial by jury guaranteed
by the sixth and fourteenth amendments.
In November of 1973, Claude Ballew, manager of the Paris
Art Adult Theatre, exhibited the motion picture film entitled
"Behined The Green Door". Subsequently, Ballew was
charged with two counts of distributing obscene materials in
violation of Ga. Code §26-2101 (1972). Pursuant to the Georgia
Constitutioni which prescribed a minimum of five jurors for all
courts except superior courts, Ballew was convicted on both
counts by a five person jury. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of
Georgia rejected Ballew's contention that a trial before a jury of
less than six persons was unconstitutional (Ballew u. State, 138
Ga. App. 530, 227 S.E. 2d 65, 69 (1976), and added that it was
bound by Sanders u. State, 234 Ga. 586,216 S.E. 2d 838 (1975),
cert. denied 424 U.S. 931 (1976), in which the Supreme Court
of Georgia upheld the constitutionality of the five person jury.
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court deliberated
the sole issue of "whether a state criminal trial to a jury of only
five persons deprives the accused of the right to trial by jury
guaranteed to him by the sixth and fourteenth amendments."
Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 224 (1978).
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
Mr. Justice Blackmun announced the principal opinion of
the court and was joined by Mr. Justice Stevens. Mr. Justice
Blackmun noted that the sixth amendment was made
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment in
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), because a "trial by
jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of
justice." Id. at 149. In Duncan, the Court emphasized that the
salient purpose of the right to a jury trial is to prevent oppres-
sion by the Government (Id. at 155) and that this can be
achieved by having the community participate in the determi-
nations of guilt.
The issue of how many jurors are mandated by the sixth
amendment was confronted by the Court in Williams u.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). In Williams, the Supreme Court
ruled that while common law juries were composed of a fixed
number of twelve persons, this feature "appears to have been a
'GA. CONST. art. 6, §16 1, codified as GA. CODE §2.5101 (1973).
historical accident unrelated to the great purpose which gave
rise to the jury in the first place." Id. at 89-90. Therefore, the
court held that a twelve member jury is not an indispensable
component of the sixth amendment. The sixth amendment re-
quires that a jury be "large enough to promote group deliber-
ation, free from outside attempts at intimidation, and to provide
a fair possibility for obtaining a representative cross-section of
the community." Id. at 100. In sum, the Court ruled that a six
person jury passed constitutional muster but refrained from
expressing judgment on juries with less than six jurors.
RECENT EMPIRICAL DATA
By 1970, empirical research evaluating jury performance was
exiguous. However, between 1970 and 1977 numerous
scholarly studies of juries and effect of their size upon their ver
dicts were generated.2 Mr. Justice Blackmun commented that
the studies "[raised] significant questions about the wisdom
and constitutionality of a reduction below six." 435 U.S. at 232.
For example, recent empirical data indicate that as juries
decrease in size, the less likely they are to foster effective group
deliberation. Likewise, statistical studies reveal that "the risk of
convicting an innocent person... rises as the size of the jury
diminishes. Because the risk of not convicting a guilty person
... increases with the size of the panel, an optimal jury can be
selected as a function of the interaction between the two risks."
Id. at 234. Also, progressively smaller juries hinder the repre-
sentation of minority viewpoints of the community.
Concomitantly, "if the smaller and smaller juries will lack con-
sistency, as the cited studies suggest, then the common sense
of the community will not be applied equally in like cases." Id. at
242.
Thus, after surveying a host of scholarly studies, Mr. Justice
Blackmun concluded that "the purpose and functioning of the
jury in a criminal trial is seriously impaired, and to a constitu-
tional degree, by a reduction in size to below six members." 435
U.S. at 239. The contention that the utilization of juries with
less than six members saves court time and money was not of
sufficient significance to offset the substantial threat to sixth
and fourteenth amendment guarantees.
AVOIDING STATISTICAL STUDIES
While all nine justices agreed that a five person jury was too
'E.g., Note, Six-Member and Twelve Member Juries: An Empirical Study of Trial
Results, 6 U. MICH J. L. REFORM 671 (1973), Lempert, Uncouering "Nondis-
cernible" Differences: Empirical Research and the Jury-Size Cases, 73MICH L.
REV 643 (1975); Zeisel and Diamond, "Convincing Empirical Evidence" on the
Six Member Jury, 41 U. CHI L. REV. 281 (1974); Bogue andFritz, TheSix Man
Jury, 17 S. DAK L. REV. 285 (1972).
small to satisfy the sixth and fourteenth amendments' guaran-
tee of a right to trial by jury, the remaining seven justices
declined to base their decisions on incipient social science data.
Mr. Justice White concurred in the judgment because he
agreed that a jury of less than six persons would fail to repre-
sent the sense of the community and thus fail to achieve a fair
cross-section of the community. Justice Powell, joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, concurred in the judg-
ment but noted that Justice Blackmun's heavy reliance on
numerology was unwarranted. Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by
Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Marshall, argued that while
the sixth and fourteenth amendments mandate juries in
criminal cases with more than five members, Ballew should not
be subjected to a new trial since the Georgia law was "over-
broad and therefore facially unconstitutional." Id., at 246.
In conclusion, the Court felt that juries with six or more
members represent a fair cross-section of the community,
promote unbiased decision- making, and thus safeguard the
constitutional guarantees of the sixth and fourteenth amend-
ments.
In passing it should be mentioned that in Maryland, the Mary-
land Declaration of Rights 3 grants to the accused the right to
juror unanimity in criminal trials. However, the defendant, with
the court's consent and the prosecutor's consent, may waive
unanimity. 4 Concomitantly, Maryland Rule 751 states that in
criminal trials the parties may stipulate to a jury of less than
twelve members. Although the Supreme Court has sanctioned
less than unanimous verdicts with twelve member juries, the
Court will eventually have to address the issue of unanimity for
juries with less than twelve members.
-J. Michael Dougherty, Jr.
Photo by JJR.
3MD. DEC. OF RIGHTS art. 21.
4State v. McKay, 280 Md. 558, 375 A. 2d.228 (1977). See, 7 U. BALT. L. REV. 130
(1977).
The Press v.
The Prosecution
Constitutional struggle between the government and the
press is not a novel phenomenon. The interests of the two often
conflict and as a result of a recent Supreme Court decision, the
friction seems likely to continue. In Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,
98 S. Ct. 1970 (1978), the Justices were confronted with the
question of whether the government, pursuant to a search
warrant, may constitutionally seize evidence from a newspaper
when the paper is not suspected of criminal activity.
The Supreme Court decided that a newspaper unsuspected
of involvement in a crime cannot automatically and absolutely
claim immunity from a search warrant for evidence related to
that same crime. By a vote of 5-3, Justice Brennan not
participating, the Court held that when a place to be searched
is occupied by a person not then a suspect, a warrant to search
for evidence reasonably believed to be present can be issued
despite the absence of unusual circumstances. The essential
element is the reasonable cause to believe that the objects to be
sought are indeed present on the premises into which entry is
made.
This decision affirmed Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 550 F2d.
464 (9th Cir. 1977), which required the existence of probable
cause to believe that the owner of the property to be searched
would have disregarded the court order not to remove or
destroy evidence as a basis for issuance of the search warrant.
Both the Court of Appeals and the District Court, 353 F.Supp.
124 (N.D. Cal. 1972) emphasized the absence of suspected
criminal involvement on the part of the newspaper reporter. In
such a case, probable cause to think that evidence of a crime is
located on the property is not alone sufficient to justify the
issuance of a warrant; a threat concerning the removal or de-
struction of evidence must be clearly shown.
On Friday, April 9, 1971, a student demonstration was held
at the Stanford University Hospital and culminated in the
demonstrators' forcible occupation of the administrative
offices. The police departments of the City of Palo Alto and
Santa Clara County were called to remove the students. After
several attempts were made to persuade the demonstrators to
leave peacefully, the police broke through one of the barri-
cades that had been erected by the protestors at both the east
and west ends of the corridor adjacent to the administrative
offices. As the police moved through the west end, the
protestors emerged from the east end with sticks and attacked
the police stationed there. All nine of the policemen were
injured.
A photographer for the Stanford Daily News was also
located at the east end of the corridor. On April 11, the
Stanford Daily carried a story about the demonstration,
complete with pictures and a byline of a Daily staff member. On
April 12, the District Attorney for Santa Clara County secured
a warrant for the immediate search of the Daily offices for nega-
tives, film and pictures of the April 9th event. The District At-
torney claimed that he had justifiable, reasonable and probable
cause to believe that he could locate evidence relevant to the
identity of the individuals who attacked the Hospital's admini-
strative offices. The search included the photo lab, filing
cabinets, desks and waste paper baskets but excluded locked
drawers and rooms. Notes were read and photos were found
but nothing was removed.
The Stanford Daily News argued that the actions
nevertheless threatened its ability to gather, analyze, and dis-
seminate news. Specifically, the Daily alleged that the search
